Showing posts with label Accounting. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Accounting. Show all posts

Monday, 19 December 2011

Was the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Good News for Corporate Bondholders?

Published on Accounting Horizons

Authors: Mark L. DeFond, Mingyi Hung, Emre Carr, and Jieying Zhang


We investigate the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) on corporate bondholder value by examining the bond market reaction to news events leading up to the passage of SOX.

The net impact of SOX on bondholder value is difficult to predict, and there are many reasons why it may be viewed as either good or bad news. Our primary analysis reveals a significant decline in average bondholder value around these events.

In addition, cross-sectional tests find that the decline is significantly larger among riskier bonds and among bonds held by firms that are expected to experience the greatest changes under SOX. Thus, our findings are consistent with the bond market expecting the exogenously imposed changes under SOX to make bondholders worse off.

Monday, 26 September 2011

Do Firms Adjust Their Timely Loss Recognition in Response to Changes in the Banking Industry?

TODD A. GORMLEY, BONG HWAN KIM, XIUMIN MARTIN

Published on JAR

This paper investigates the impact of changes in the banking sector on firms’ timely recognition of economic losses.

In particular, we focus on the entry of foreign banks into India during the 1990s, which likely causes an exogenous increase in lender demand for timely loss recognition. Analyzing variation in both the timing and the location of the new foreign banks’ entries, we find that foreign bank entry is associated with more timely loss recognition and this increase is positively related to a firm's subsequent debt levels. The change appears driven by a shift in firms’ incentives to supply additional information to lenders and lenders seem to value this information. The increase in timely loss recognition is also concentrated among firms more dependent on external financing: private firms, smaller firms, and non-group firms. Overall, our evidence suggests that a firm's accounting choices respond to changes in the banking industry.

Tuesday, 26 April 2011

Kiểm toán độc lập

Thông qua Luật kiểm toán độc lập

Luật mới sẽ hạn chế kiểm toán “thông đồng” với doanh nghiệp => Sure? Research của Anh, Mỹ, Canada với búa xua luật mới show ... mixed results trong chuyện này. Vấn đề chính là game là này 1 very complicated game.

Kết quả kiểm toán: Mong manh ranh giới lãi- lỗ

Nhức nhối chênh lệch trước và sau kiểm toán Có đụng tới 1 key point: nếu DN opportunistically restate báo cáo thì làm sao? Cổ đông kiện họ hay là Sở GD phạt họ được bao nhiêu đây? Cơ bản, back về corp gov issues: level of investor protection của law. Litigation risk ở VN low nên managers không sợ?

Monday, 25 April 2011

ACCA & Deloitte nói về báo cáo diễn giải

Cần thêm trách nhiệm, bớt luật lệ trong báo cáo diễn giải

Narrative reporting được dịch là "báo cáo diễn giải"

Bài trên ACCA blog (bài từ tháng 9/2010,hèn chi đọc thấy quen quen, nhưng tự hỏi sao lại đăng vào lúc này). Hóa ra là do ACCA tổ chức hội thảo thông tin về báo cáo tại Hà Nội.

Full text

Tuesday, 5 April 2011

Accountants: Wanted

Bean counters wanted: Why the Big 4 are in a hiring frenzy

Deloitte plans to hire 17,000 professionals in the U.S. and India in 2011, according to Cathleen Benko, its chief talent officer. It's seeking accountants, auditors, consultants, and IT staff. Hiring is split evenly between experienced and entry-level applicants.

Like Deloitte, Ernst & Young has stepped up recruiting. It's looking to hire 7,000 employees from college campuses -- 4,500 full-time and 2,500 interns -- and 6,000 experienced staff, totaling 13,000 people in 2011, says Dan Black, its director of Americas Campus Recruiting. Experienced staffing is up 80% from last year and campus recruits are up 20%.

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The comments in this article are also quite funny.

Tuesday, 29 March 2011

Earnings surprise

KAC: ‘Gây shock’ với lợi nhuận sau kiểm toán giảm 37,6%

NVT: "Quán quân" lợi nhuận sau kiểm toán giảm tới 62%


Báo cáo kiểm toán: ‘Shock’ với những con số giảm trên 20%



Nói chung có thể build 1 chỉ số là earnings surprise before auditing và after auditing để coi nhóm CP nào là có nhiều Earnings Surprise hơn cả.